Refused to commit on pecking order user growth.
- 60 cagr building blocks — answer hedged.
- Pecking order user growth — question deflected.
- Contribution per order dip — answer hedged.
The 100% guidance no longer holds for FY27 given competition. When you give 60% CAGR medium-term guidance, what margin of safety is built in? If competition stays as-is or worsens, what is the range of outcomes? What are the building blocks to get to 60% CAGR?
We've addressed that in question three of the letter with the building blocks - it's a function of assortment expansion, geographical expansion, demand densification in existing cities, and potentially newer cities. Intensifying competitive activity isn't going to last beyond the three-year period. We are fairly comfortable and confident that over three years we can deliver this CAGR of growth.
On the building blocks - can you give a pecking order among user growth, frequency, and average order value in terms of what drives the most growth?
We can't project with that accuracy at this point. We are learning as we're building this market and these things might change - we don't want to put out numbers that we then have to defend on the next call.
Contribution per order dipped slightly this quarter - is this largely an AOV function or is there more to read into it? Also, any plans to match Swiggy's Toing model with a different price structure, or is Bistro the affordability option? Any updates on Bistro?
On contribution, AOV is one factor but not called out as the key driver. Last mile delivery is also seasonal; delivery partner supply changes by month; supply chain costs can have efficiencies being banked. Net-net, the movement in contribution doesn't change the trajectory. Longer term, nothing to call out. On Bistro and Toing - no plans to do what Swiggy is doing with Toing; not clear what problem it solves for consumers or restaurants. Bistro is still a small experiment with early signs of a business model evolving, but very small and early. We're watching the space and if we see a thesis that makes sense, we'll follow suit.
As AOV goes up and seasonality changes, should contribution direction be upwards at least for now? And does the NCR margin of 5-6% imply contribution of 8-9% or higher?
As we move to 5-6% margin at some point, contribution margin will go up and on a year-on-year basis we'll see that trend consistently. On the specific NCR contribution data point, not sharing it. But broadly it'll be somewhere in that range.
Over the last two to three years there's been significant linearity between store additions and growth. Is there anything to suggest that will change over the next three years?
It's not a straightforward comparison. In some parts of the network we're still in a store build-out phase. In other parts we just have to create supply in different ways to serve customers as assortment expands. Our job is to make sure supply is there whether in smaller or bigger stores. That number becomes very complicated to do math on in such a simplistic way.
You talked about 17 million of warehousing capacity across dark stores and supply chain hubs. What was the number a quarter back or a year back to understand the potential uplift from utilizing existing capacity?
We don't disclose that. If you won't find it in our letter, it's not a miss.
Orders per day per store has been broadly flat for a long period. When can we see some uplift in that number given operating leverage benefits?
The contours of the business might keep changing. We're not hung up on certain metrics going in a certain direction for the business to work. There could be arguments that the number doesn't go up and still the business might deliver 5-6% margin. That's also possible. We're not constraining ourselves in a certain way of thinking about it. That's why we give guidance for overall growth rather than this metric - because these variables might evolve as we go along. It's a good number to track. That's why we disclose it. But we don't know how it will trend.
Advertising and promotion cost in absolute terms was flat sequentially. What proportion goes to Blinkit? Philosophically, are you okay to let go of near-term market share to focus on profitability, or will you react to competition given the 60%+ growth guidance?
Consolidated ad promotions include multiple things - promotional spend in food delivery channeled to value-conscious customers, customer acquisition for quick commerce, and marketing for food delivery. Each business has its own nuances and dynamics. We can't strip that apart. The commentary given for each business reflects our strategy.
Can you give quantitative understanding of how non-metro cities are doing in terms of business size per store - revenue or orders per day - relative to metro versus tier 1 or tier 2? Also, inventory days seem to have gone up over the last few quarters after the transition to 1P. What is driving this and what would be a comfortable level from a risk perspective?
We don't disclose the breakup of our business in larger cities versus emerging cities intentionally. On inventory days, before giving more color - inventory days is not related in any way to the tier 1 vs tier 2/3 split. Q3 to Q4 there hasn't been any meaningful increase apart from growth in the scale of the business. Inventory days are fairly steady; we're not seeing that increase unlike what was suggested.
Competition hasn't changed much but you still expect 60%+ CAGR. What is the North Star metric - MTC addition, order growth, NOV growth, or market share - that tells you when you need to change your stance and react to competition?
We keep reacting according to what we feel is right and it depends on micro markets. Our stance is around the principles we have for building a healthy business. There are places where our MOV is also lower and where we offer free delivery. These are not unidimensional calls. We look at customer retention and frequency in our own business - as long as we don't see that being impacted meaningfully, the choice to stick to our principles is still there. Over the last few months we haven't seen customers turn away too much and hence no need to react more than what we've already done.
Food delivery is close to 20% growth at 5.5% margin. The mid-quarter platform fee hike should flow through in Q1. How do you think about incremental operating leverage and monetization flowing through the food delivery P&L? Will you reinvest in growth, or is there upside risk to the NOV margin guidance?
We have always been more leaning towards growth. If we can find ways to effectively reinvest incremental margin, we would do that because the objective is to optimize for growth of absolute profit, not the profit margin percentage. That's always been the principle. What we're seeing in the last two to three quarters in food delivery is good ROI on investments for growth. Net-net, this should ensure absolute profit continues to grow at the fastest pace possible. But in future, if that stops happening, we could see incremental revenue flowing down to profitability and that's also fine. Outcome could be either percentage margin increasing or growth going up - both optimize for absolute dollar EBITDA.
Within the 60%+ CAGR guidance for quick commerce, would the top 20 cities still be about 40%? Also, on ad monetization in QC, is it mostly SKUs you stock that are surfaced to customers, or do ad loads at checkout and top of funnel ads also contribute meaningfully? Third, on supply chain automation - are you looking at more automation capex over the next two to three years and any guidance on capex beyond store additions?
On the first question, we don't give that breakup and won't give that color. On ad monetization - non-paid ads by brands or platforms which don't sell on the Blinkit platform are insignificant for us. On capex and automation - we keep testing for that. The framework is that capex should have ROCE that we can track and is visible. Directionally, yes, automation is increasing in all our warehouses and will continue over the next few years. But how much is automated is a function of the cost and efficiency uplift we get.
On dark store additions mix, is it still 80% urban and 20% tier 2/3 or has that changed?
That's changing. We're not giving specific guidance but increasingly a large part of our growth will come from geographic diversification so we will see that mix change over time.
On assortment expansion - does that mean you're looking to upgrade some dark stores to bigger size or add more dark stores in the vicinity?
It means we're going to expand our assortment by whichever way we can. Store size is a function of many factors including availability, specific neighborhood and urban infrastructure. It's a very hyperlocal call. Size is also going up as a function of availability of real estate and how we want the store design to be. There is no single answer that applies to every city and every locality.
Multiple platforms globally are seeing the ceiling on ad revenue as a percentage of GMV moving up due to AI. Does this mean at some point the room for your steady-state margins could also move up in both food delivery and quick commerce?
Generally, we don't operate with a cap in mind. We don't know what the cap is honestly. We'll respond to the realities of the situation around us and if that means an opportunity for higher ad income, so be it. The same framework applies - if we have higher margins, can we invest in growth? Can that growth drive more profit? That's the mental model. We don't operate with a set of metrics with ceilings or target goals in mind.
When talking about QC steady-state margin of 5-6%, is there an implied assumption of how much ads contribute to that 5-6%?
No, as I said, we don't know - we're discovering that. Quick commerce is a much younger business than food delivery. It's already doing more in terms of ad as a percentage of NOV. We don't necessarily have a number in mind on where it finally lands.
On the overall EBITDA guidance of $1 billion by FY29 - if food delivery is growing 19-20% and District EBITDA targets for FY30 are known, then stripping back implies a quick commerce margin of around 3-3.5%. Is that the expected margin for quick commerce in the next three to four years?
Broadly the math is fine. No specific guidance given, so numbers could move a bit depending on how things pan out, but the way you did the math is broadly in line with how we're thinking about it.
Fixed cost in quick commerce has been flat this quarter yet MTU numbers are strong - how to reconcile these? Also, dark store additions were flat but you had mentioned picking up additions this quarter; are you still on track for 3,000 stores by March?
MTU additions remain strong because marketing spend for new customer acquisition hasn't come down. Competitors have pulled back so cost of acquisition is very low - we continue to see value in keeping marketing spend high. On store additions, we're firmly on track for 3,000 stores by March. No guidance beyond that; the 60% CAGR guidance implies some reasonable store expansion but we won't give specific store number guidance.
If 3,000 stores happen, does that mean FY27 growth will be 70-80% rather than the 100% indicated earlier?
Yes, it will not be 100%, but we are not guiding to a specific number. We need flexibility in the medium and short term to respond to market dynamics. We've given a more longer-term three-year guidance. In the short term we will respond to the situation and if there are options for acceleration we'll do that. We're not closing the door on any options over the next 12 months.
With well-capitalized competitors, do you see a concern of MTU or user penetration reaching saturation in the foreseeable future?
No, we don't.
In the June quarter you expect meaningful QoQ growth acceleration. Outside of AOV reversal and fewer days in March quarter, are there any other drivers - greater store additions or anything else?
The only other factor will be seasonality. Different season drives different consumption patterns and summer driving growth in certain categories. That will also lead to slightly higher growth in addition to the two drivers mentioned.
On the 60% growth guidance - are you seeing any early signs of competitive activity easing, which gives visibility of this starting to play out from the next couple of quarters?
Competitive activity hasn't meaningfully changed from the last time we were on this call. Our stance is also the same - we will keep an eye out but do the right things for the business. We've mostly delivered on what we thought we would accomplish in the face of whatever competition is going on. Whatever guidance we're giving, we're not changing our outlook.
For Blinkit profitability reaching ~3% over three years, what are the biggest unlocks either in cost or monetization to get there?
So far, we are not really assuming any further unlocks that would really do it. If we just keep doing our job and execute the way we are doing, we should be able to get there.
You seem to be growing ahead of the market. Are you happy to grow in line with the market going forward at the 60% CAGR? Also, what is the most non-negotiable KPI to crack for QC profitability - orders per day per store or NAOV?
In a fairly competitive market it is hard to figure out what the actual market growth rate is apart from the two public players. We are more concerned about whether our quality of growth is maintained. Going forward, quality growth that meaningfully takes the business towards profitability and sustainability - that is the only non-negotiable. There are multiple ways to get there.
Customer retention (orders per customer) has come down from 3.6 to 3.35 over the last couple of quarters. Is that due to retention impact from competitive intensity or from significant addition of new customers with lower ordering frequency?
Largely the latter. We haven't seen too much impact on customer retention despite being more expensive in certain geographies. Most of this is on account of the acceleration in new customer addition that we have seen in the last couple of quarters.
You said you offered a lower MOV of INR 99 to make food more affordable, but you've also been consistently increasing platform fees. How does that tie up?
Platform fees are applicable to all customers, but offers and discounts can be targeted to price-sensitive cohorts in certain locations where subsidies actually deliver growth. That doesn't work for all customers or geographies. We're essentially increasing overall revenue per order through platform fee increases and then channeling that revenue to select cohorts in select geographies where we're seeing growth.
On District, there are media reports of events getting canceled due to artists unable to come to India because of the war. Will the business still deliver strong numbers despite these macro challenges?
This won't impact the overall broad growth path. Events is just a part of the business and we have multiple categories now. A few concerts getting delayed or postponed or canceled will not impact the outlook on the business.
Follow-up on growth and competition - will you react to competition or maintain principles?
To the best of our knowledge, we are growing as fast as we can in the market, adhering to the principle that growth has to be meaningful and healthy both in the short and long term. You can always argue we can grow faster through unhealthy growth but we don't think that unhealthy growth will eventually turn into healthy growth just by magic. This is the fastest we've been able to grow this quarter while adhering to our core principles.
On the standalone business, ad spends include food delivery plus District ad spends - is that right?
It's not entire District, only a part - largely the dining-out business. Businesses are split across multiple entities so it's generally hard to reconcile MIS with reported financials unless you have more data.
Follow-up on low CAC commentary reconciling with MTU addition.
For the same marketing dollars, we are seeing more new customer addition. That's what I meant when I said the CAC for us is reducing.
You mentioned 80-90% geographic coverage in pin codes of top eight cities. Does this mean incremental growth in these cities will now be less led by customer addition and more by wallet share and average spend per customer? And will MTC additions be largely driven by non-top-8 cities?
Partly true, but even in cities with high pin code coverage, it doesn't mean we've maxed out on potential customers in that neighborhood. While assortment expansion will drive higher wallet share for existing customers, an equally or maybe even larger portion of growth will continue from customer addition, given the low penetration within the pin codes we cover.
On Blinkit, how should we think about discounting prevalent in quick commerce today and how confident are you in maintaining pricing discipline while achieving 60% growth CAGR?
We are very confident of maintaining our pricing discipline. We're not sure what competition will do. How much of the market is froth, how much is artificially inflated by discounts - it's very hard to tell. We are retaining the customer who is the more profitable customer and fits what Blinkit stands for.
What new categories is District looking to add, particularly within travel?
We have no plans to add any more categories to District than what we already have, and travel is not a focus area for us at this point.
Hyperpure reported a small margin this quarter but you haven't included this when talking about future profitability. Should we assume this business remains insignificant from an overall profitability perspective?
Not really. The billion-dollar profit statement includes all businesses we are in today, including Hyperpure. It might be the smallest, but it will still be meaningful and relevant.
Food delivery order growth was 15% YoY but active delivery partners grew 30%; in QC, order growth was slightly above 90% but rider growth was 120%. In food delivery, what explains this gap - orders per rider per month has come down 10-15% in both businesses over last year?
The nuance here is the changing nature of how much people work every day on these platforms. We are seeing more and more part-timers also delivering, and that actually increases the active partners but reduces the number of orders they do per shift per day.
Is competition also intense in tier 2 and tier 3 cities or are there fewer operators and hence lower competition there?
The competitive intensity is fairly high pretty much wherever everybody is. Different set of players in different markets. Someone is aggressive somewhere at this point. For us, it's competitive everywhere.
Any sensitivity of higher fuel prices to food delivery demand? Historically, have higher fuel prices impacted demand?
It depends on the quantum. Generally, fuel price increases will lead to higher last mile delivery costs. What percentage we pass on to consumers is something we'll decide when the time comes. In the past, going by the last 12 to 18 months, experiences like the GST hike showed we were fairly easily able to pass it on to consumers without too much impact on demand. Unless it's a drastic increase, I don't expect fuel price increases to have a meaningful impact on margins.